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THE IMPACT OF LOVELACE V.
ONTARIO ON SECTION 15 OF
THE CHARTER
By Lori Sterling

*

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 20, 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in
Lovelace v. Ontario (the Lovelace case).1 This was the first case to reach the
Supreme Court of Canada that focused on section 15(2) of the Charter. 2 Section
15(2) states:
Subsection [15](1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.

The facts of this case were that the government had reached an agreement with
bands under the Indian Act3 to provide a licence for a commercial casino, with the
net profits being distributed amongst all bands in Ontario. After three years of
negotiations between the Chiefs of Ontario, who represented the bands, and the
government of Ontario, the casino was constructed on a reserve near Orillia and
was called Casino Rama. Just before the opening of Casino Rama, however,
several Métis and non-status Indian groups and communities brought a legal
_______________________________________________________________
*
The author acted as counsel for the respondent Ontario. An earlier version of this paper is to
be published in the LSUC 2000 Charter lectures. The views expressed herein are those of the author
alone and do not represent the position of the government of Ontario. This paper was originally presented
at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the
Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional Development Program at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 950.
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
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challenge alleging that their exclusion from the project violated their right to equal
treatment under section 15(1) of the Charter.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the Casino Rama project on
the basis that it did not violate section 15(1) of the Charter. In its decision, the
Supreme Court of Canada had to grapple with complex questions such as the
relationship between section 15(1) and (2), and the difference between an
ameliorative program that targets a small group of disadvantaged beneficiaries
(“targeted programs”) and a program that is generally available (“universal
programs”). The Court also had to resolve the vexing question of what role is left
for section 1 of the Charter in the context of a challenge to a section 15(2)
ameliorative program. Further, the Court had to analyze the differences between
aboriginal groups and make findings on whether the Casino Rama project perpetuated
the stereotyping of Métis and non-status Indians.
The purpose of this paper is to canvass the different approaches to section 15(2) of
the Charter that were open to the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt in the Lovelace
case and to analyze the particular approach the Court ultimately chose. In particular,
it is suggested that while the Court refused to acknowledge that it was amending the
section 15(1) test for targeted programs, it did, in fact, do so by modifying the
“contextual factors” which are considered in the assessment of discrimination. The
result is a test for affirmative action programs which purports to simply apply the preexisting section 15(1) jurisprudence but, in reality, modifies it so that such programs
are more likely to withstand a constitutional challenge.

II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SECTION 15(2)
There were several different approaches open to the Court to adopt when
deciding whether an ameliorative, targeted program violates the equality rights of
an excluded group. Not all of these approaches, however, were put to the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Lovelace case, and there exists a myriad of other options
that are not discussed in this paper.4
One option not recommended to the Supreme Court of Canada by any of the
parties but that was ultimately discussed by the Court is the so-called “rationality
approach.” This approach is found in the lower court jurisprudence and suggests
that it is appropriate to modify the standard section 15(1) test by incorporating a
review of the “rationality” of the affirmative action program. An early example of
this rationality approach is found in Apsit v. Manitoba Human Rights
_______________________________________________________________
4

Other approaches not canvassed in this paper include: Subjective Intent Analysis: see Ontario
Human Rights Commission v. Ontario (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 387, at 393-94 (C.A.); Subjective Purpose
and Ancillary Features Assessment: see Pierce, “A Progressive Interpretation of Subsection 15(2) of the
Charter” (1993), 57 Sask. L. Rev. 263; Objective Purpose Analysis: see Penner v. Danbrook, [1992] 4
W.W.R. 385, at 389-90 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1993] 1 S.C.R. viii.
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Commission.5 In this case, the Manitoba Queen’s Bench struck down a program
that gave native persons an advantage in growing wild rice. The Court struck down
the program on the basis that native persons already had an advantage in this area
and what they really needed was help with other skills. It is suggested that this
decision sets too high a standard for affirmative action programs. Why not assist
native persons in areas that are related to their tradition and culture and where they
have prior experience?
The main advantage of the rationality approach is that it allows excluded groups
the opportunity to bring a challenge and receive an explanation as to why the
program was created. One criticism of this approach, however, is that it may render
the section 1 test redundant. How could a program that has been found not to be
rational then meet the section 1 test?
A variation on this approach is found in R. v. Willocks.6 This case dealt with a
program to assist aboriginal persons in the justice system by offering them a
“diversion” program for certain offences. The program was challenged by a
Jamaican accused who was not eligible for diversion. Watt J., in obiter, discussed
the ambit of section 15(2) and adopted a test which permitted affirmative programs
to pass constitutional muster unless there was “gross unfairness.” “Gross
unfairness” was intended to permit a higher degree of deference toward such
programs than one of rationality. He stated:
In any program which is designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged
group, others will be “disadvantaged” as a result of their non-eligibility for
participation. Section 15(2) acknowledges as much. What must be avoided is gross
unfairness to others. The Charter does not ask, in my respectful view, that an
affirmative action program within s. 15(2), must address at once all individuals or
groups who suffer similar disadvantage. There must be some room left to establish and
give effect to priorities amongst disadvantaged groups, provided there is no gross
unfairness.7

A second approach to section 15(2) was articulated by the appellants in the
Lovelace case8 and was supported by a native women’s group, the Native
Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC), which had intervened in this case. The
appellants had argued that section 15(2) was only intended to prevent challenges
_______________________________________________________________
5
[1988] 1 W.W.R. 629 (Man. Q.B.). See for criticism of this approach, Vizkelety,
“Affirmative Action, Equality and the Courts: Comparing Action Travail des Femmes v. CN and Apsit
and the Manitoba Rice Farmers Association v. The Manitoba Human Rights Commission” (1990), 4
C.J.W.L. 287.
6
(1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 552 (Gen. Div.).
7
Id., at 571.
8
See Pothier, “Charter Challenges to Underinclusive Legislation: The Complexities of Sins of
Omission” (1993), Queen’s L.J. 261, for further discussion of this approach.
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from advantaged groups. It therefore operated as a complete bar to the bringing of
a section15 challenge by an advantaged group to an affirmative action program. For
excluded disadvantaged groups, however, section 15(2) had no relevance whatsoever. In
other words, where an excluded disadvantaged group demonstrated a violation of
section 15(1), the onus then shifted to the government to justify the programs under
section 1 of the Charter.9 Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court of Canada
accepted this approach.
The appellant’s approach is problematic for several reasons. It is at odds with
the plain language of section 15(2), which does not draw any distinction based on
who the potential challenger is. As well, it ignores section 15(2) except in
challenges from a limited class of potential applicants: advantaged persons.
A serious problem with this approach is that it could dissuade governments and
community-based groups from jointly developing ameliorative programs,
especially those that involve incremental or experimental phases. The existence of
a minority legal aid clinic may be due to the fact that a particular community hall
was rent-free and that student lawyers were willing to staff the clinic rather than
because of a survey done of all minority groups to see which one was most needy
or a review of the facilities that were available in different communities. Simply
stated, the appellant’s approach may not provide governments with sufficient
encouragement to develop affirmative action programs as a means to achieve
equality, because a program will readily be open to challenge. The Court of Appeal
in Lovelace explained why it is important to grant governments some leeway for
affirmative action programs, as follows:
Governments have no constitutional obligation to remedy all conditions of
disadvantage in our society. If government affirmative action programs can be too
readily challenged because, for example, they do not go far enough in remedying
disadvantage, governments will be discouraged from initiating such programs.
Governments should be able to establish special programs under section 15(2) that
distinguish between or even within groups protected under section 15(1).10

If a rigorous section 1 analysis were required for any of these programs to
survive then the government and the beneficiaries might be less inclined to develop
such programs.
Finally, this approach raises the spectre of further litigation over the meaning of an
“advantaged” group. It fails to recognize that the concept of advantage is complex
because it is both relative and contextual. Under this approach, a program which
_______________________________________________________________
9

This approach appears to be motivated by a concern that governments might play favourites
with disadvantaged groups, and highlights a distrust of affirmative action programs, even among some
equality-seeking groups.
10
Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735, at 755 (C.A.).
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provides a hospice for AIDS patients could be challenged by a group composed of
Alzheimer’s patients. How is a court to determine which group is more
disadvantaged?
A third approach to section 15(2), which was adopted by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Lovelace but rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, focused on the
purposes of the program. Specifically, the Court of Appeal found that where a
program, on objective grounds, has as its purpose the provision of a benefit or
assistance to a disadvantaged group, there is no violation of section 15(1) as long
as the excluded group does not fall within the purposes of the program. In contrast,
where an excluded disadvantaged group does fall within the purposes of a program
then it is open to that group to argue that the program violates section 15(1) of the
Charter.
This approach was consistent with the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario 11 and the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs.12 In Gibbs,
the Court examined an employer’s disability plan and held that it was intended to
cover both mental and physical disabilities. Under the plan, however, mental
disabilities were subject to time-limited coverage whereas physical disabilities
were not so limited. The Court held that the plan violated the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Act on the basis that it inappropriately excluded a group on the
prohibited ground of mental disability even though that group fell within the general
purposes of the program. The Court distinguished this type of program from a more
limited one intended to provide hand insurance for piano teachers on the basis that the
purpose of this latter type of program was not a general employment disability
program.
Perhaps the most elaborate application of this approach to section 15(2) is found
in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Lovelace. The Court in that case
reviewed the entire evidentiary record and concluded that the purpose of the
Casino Rama was to provide Indian bands with the opportunity for economic
development through a casino operation. The excluded group did not fall within
the imperatives of this program, which required a reserve-base, experience with
gaming and a high degree of financial and political accountability and
identifiability. As well, this program responded to a well-articulated selfgovernment aspiration and interest in a commercial casino operation by bands.
A fourth and final approach to section 15(2) discussed in this paper and
ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lovelace builds on the
section 15(1) test as articulated in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
_______________________________________________________________
11
12

(1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 387 (C.A.).
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 566, at 591-92, 594.
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Immigration):13 The Law approach to section 15(1) was not discussed in the Court
of Appeal decision in Lovelace since the Law decision had not yet been rendered.
At the time the Court of Appeal rendered its decision, the Supreme Court was
deeply divided on the analytic framework for section 15(1) of the Charter, and so it
was not surprising that the Court of Appeal turned to the human rights
jurisprudence.
In Law, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the following approach for the
determination of a violation of section 15(1):
The approach adopted … focuses upon three central issues:
(A)
(B)
(C)

whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others,
in purpose or effect;
whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination are
the basis for the differential treatment; and
whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory
within the meaning of the equality guarantee. 14

The Supreme Court of Canada further held that determining whether a program
is “discriminatory” involves an analysis of whether the program reflects stereotypes
or presumed characteristics which have the effect of perpetuating or promoting the
view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition. This definition of
discrimination is intended to promote human dignity, equal concern, consideration
and respect.
In order to assess discrimination, the Court suggested an analysis of four
“contextual factors”:
(1)
(2)

whether the excluded group had a pre-existing disadvantage;
whether the alleged ground of discrimination corresponds to the needs,
capacity or circumstances of the Charter applicant;
(3) whether the purpose or effect of the program is to ameliorate the
condition of more disadvantaged groups; and,
(4) whether the nature and scope of the interests affect the core of human
dignity.15
_______________________________________________________________
13

[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
Id., at 548.
15
For more recent applications of the Law test see M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at 45-47;
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at 215-16; Winko v.
British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, at 675; Delisle v. Canada
(Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at 1022-25; and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, at 727-40.
14
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Although the presence of a judicial consensus in the Law case on the appropriate
approach to section 15(1) was applauded by the legal community and the public
more generally, the test itself can be criticized on at least three fronts. First, it has
been suggested that this test is unduly complex. One author has suggested that
there are 16 steps before you are in a position to obtain a response.16
As well, the test may well be indeterminate in the result and at least easily
manipulable. Because there is only a series of questions to ask or guidelines to
follow in the assessment of discrimination, with no weighting system for each
question, the answer to any constitutional challenge is difficult to predict. What if
answers to some questions point to discrimination whereas answers to other
questions do not? How do you decide which contextual factors prevail?
Finally, as discussed more fully below in the analysis of the Lovelace decision
itself, it is certainly arguable that the Court in Law has melded section 15(1) with
parts of the traditional section 1 Charter test. In particular, by including the second
contextual factor of merit, capacity and circumstances (also called the
correspondence factor) within section 15(1), the Court is asking questions similar
to those asked under section 1 of the Charter.
In terms of the application of Law to targeted programs, a plain reading would
suggest that many affirmative action programs could be challenged under section
15(1). This is because such programs usually do provide for differential treatment
based on an enumerated and analogous ground. As well, the Law decision suggests
that exclusion from a benefit itself can be demeaning and doesn’t appreciate that
affirmative action programs can exclude groups without necessarily diminishing
the dignity of those groups. Furthermore, to the extent that such programs may
target a disadvantaged group that is nevertheless more advantaged than another
disadvantaged group, the application of the first and third contextual factors would
suggest that such programs discriminate, in violation of section 15(1).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISION IN
LOVELACE
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the Casino Rama project
and further held that the Law test was directly applicable to targeted ameliorative
programs described by the language of section 15(2). As a result, the attributes and
frailties of Law are now part of the affirmative action context.
All the parties and intervenors in Lovelace took the position that the Law test
had to be amended in some fashion to take into account section 15(2) and the
_______________________________________________________________

16
See Bredt & Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s New Equality: A Critique” (Osgoode Hall Law
School, Charter Update, Continuing Legal Education Program, 1999 Constitutional Cases Conference, 7
April 2000).
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affirmative action context. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, was not
willing to openly admit that the test would have to be amended for the affirmative
action context. Instead, it opined that the Lovelace case was “an opportunity for the
Court to confirm that the s. 15(1) scrutiny applies just as powerfully to targeted
ameliorative programs.”17 Further, it explicitly rejected the proposition that for
section 15(2) type programs, the section 15(1) analysis should be easier to meet
because of the ameliorative purposes of such programs.18 Instead, it held that the
existing test was already sufficiently well developed to deal with affirmative action
programs without any modification. As will be discussed below, however, while
the Court was not willing to openly admit that section 15(1) had to be modified in
the affirmative action context, in fact, that is exactly what it did.
On the facts of this case, the Court found that the first step of the equality rights
test was met since there was differential treatment between the Métis and nonstatus Indian communities and the Indian bands. With respect to the second step, it
assumed, without deciding, that the differential treatment was based on an
enumerated or analogous ground such as ethnic origin.
Turning to the third and final step of the section 15(1) test, assessing whether
there was discrimination, the Court found that there was no discrimination. It
began by analyzing the first contextual factor of “pre-existing disadvantage,
stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability” of the excluded group. Previously, this
factor had been understood to require some sort of demonstration of relative
disadvantage of the excluded group vis-à-vis the beneficiaries of the program. The
Court held, however, that this was an error of interpretation. The Court opined that
it was contrary to the spirit of equality to pit disadvantaged groups against each
other in a determination of who is the worst off. To require proof of relative
disadvantage would result in a “perverse competition over which [group] is more
needy.”19
The extent to which the Supreme Court of Canada sought to deny that it was
amending this first contextual factor is evident from the following passage of the
decision:
Admittedly, in Law, there are a number of observations about what result might be
expected in relation to various constellations of relative disadvantage. However, these
were observations and nothing more; they were present in order to convey a full
appreciation of the flexibility of the substantive equality analysis. The broad and fully

_______________________________________________________________
17
18
19

981.

Lovelace, supra, note 1, at 988.
Id., at 1005.
Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735, at 760 (C.A.), and [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at
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contextual s. 15(1) analysis transcends the superficiality of a simple balancing of
relative disadvantage.20

While the amendment of the first contextual feature is appropriate for the
affirmative action context, the Supreme Court of Canada fails to recognize that this
is indeed an amendment and may well be only necessary in the context of a
targeted section 15(2) program. In most other contexts, the first contextual factor,
which had entailed evidence of relative disadvantage, would still be an appropriate
consideration in determining discrimination.
If this first contextual factor is now to be interpreted as simply asking whether the
excluded group is disadvantaged vis-à-vis society at large, it is unlikely to carry much
weight in the ultimate determination of discrimination in the affirmative action
context. This is because affirmative action programs typically target a few
disadvantaged groups and will inevitably exclude the vast majority of disadvantaged
(and advantaged) groups. In this respect, affirmative action programs are
distinguishable from universal programs which single out and exclude very few
disadvantaged groups.
The very limited weight to be attributed to this first factor in affirmative action
contexts is demonstrated by turning to the facts of the Lovelace case itself. The
Court concluded that the appellants were disadvantaged and stereotyped because of
societal attitudes toward non-status and Métis aboriginal people. The Court did not
find relative disadvantage although it did note that the excluded group could not
receive some of the federal funding provided to Indians. This contextual factor,
however, did not appear to have any impact on the result. Instead, the Supreme
Court quickly moved on in the analysis to what is likely to become the only real
issue in section 15(1) affirmative action cases, namely, whether the different merit,
capacity or circumstance of the two groups reveals a valid rationale for the
exclusion of the claimant.21
In the circumstances of the Casino Rama project, the Court carefully examined
this second contextual factor: the correspondence of the needs, capacities and
circumstances of the excluded group with the impugned programs. It concluded
that there were valid different circumstances between the two groups that justified
the exclusion of the appellants. Importantly, only the bands held the land necessary
for the casino. Furthermore, because the project involved “partnering” in a
commercial venture with the bands, it was tailored to their circumstances and
needs. The Court also found that because of the different history of illegal gaming
_______________________________________________________________
20

Lovelace, supra, note 1, at 986.
The Court dealt with the first contextual factor on the merits in one sentence when it stated:
“leaving aside as I must arguments advanced relating to the potentially discriminatory or arbitrary nature
of the exclusionary provisions of the Indian Act, the appellants have failed to establish that the First
Nations Fund functioned by device of stereotype” (Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at 993).
21
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in the two groups as well as different self-government aspirations relating to
gaming, it was appropriate for the government to start with a casino project for
bands.
The appellants had argued that the Métis and non-status Indians had similar
economic and social needs as status Indians and the Casino Rama project was simply
a device to meet those needs.22 The Court agreed that they had a similar need but
rejected need as the fundamental basis for the finding of discrimination in this case.
Instead, it held that the appropriate analysis was to focus on circumstances of the
included and excluded groups.
The analysis undertaken by the Court under this contextual factor resembles the
purpose-based approach discussed above and applied by the Court of Appeal. This
is because, at the end of the day, this factor is designed to answer the question of
whether the ameliorative purposes of the program have been met in the program
design. While the Supreme Court of Canada did not agree that it was asking a
question similar to that asked by the Court of Appeal, it did recognize that this
contextual factor is similar to the rational connection approach discussed in the
previous section and adopted in the human rights jurisprudence. The Supreme Court
concluded that “the rational connection test … matches the approach to examining the
“correspondence factor” embedded in the s. 15(1) analysis ….”23
In light of this explicit recognition of the relationship between the second
contextual factor and a rational connection test, it must be asked, what is left for
section 1 of the Charter? The Court states that by using its approach “one can
ensure that the program is subject to the full scrutiny of the discrimination analysis,
as well as the possibility of a s. 1 review.”24 The question that remains to be
answered, however, is whether a meaningful section 1 review is truly available.
On the one hand, it is arguable that the section 1 test still has a role to play since
government priorities such as deficit reduction may very well not be sufficient to
prevent a finding of discrimination but may be sufficient to meet a section 1
justification.25 Further, there may be a role for section 1 if courts require a very
precise degree of correspondence between the merits, capacities and circumstances
and the program. On the other hand, it is also arguable that there is a limited role
left for section 1 of the Charter because there is little difference between a
rationality analysis and a section 1 Oakes analysis. Indeed, it could be argued that
section 1 had set a higher threshold for the government to meet than the current
section 15 approach. This is because under the section 1 analysis, there is the
_______________________________________________________________
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Lovelace, supra, note 21, at 994.
Id., at 1007.
24
Id., at 1011.
25
See Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.),
leave to appeal denied, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 531, for an example of cost reduction as a section 1
justification.
23
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requirement of not just rationality but minimal impairment of the right at issue. As
well, under section 1 the onus lies on the government, whereas under section 15 it
lies on the claimant. As the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet explicitly
discussed the possibility of an overlapping relationship between section 15 and
section 1 of the Charter, it remains to be seen whether it will simply acknowledge it
or try to amend the test so as to minimize the overlap.
The third contextual feature in the Law case is the analysis of the ameliorative
purpose. In Law, the Court had held that ameliorative legislation that was designed
to benefit the population in general but which excludes a historically disadvantaged
claimant would “rarely escape the charge of discrimination.”26 In Lovelace,
however, the Court was required to backtrack and reject this analysis in part. Now,
at least in the targeted program context, instead of finding that programs which
exclude historically disadvantaged groups suggest discrim-ination, the Court will
focus on the ameliorative effect on the included group. The result is that this factor
in the affirmative action context will invariably suggest non-discrimination because
such programs are inevitably ameliorative.
What the Court did with this third contextual feature is modify it for the
affirmative action context by removing any comparative analysis of the
disadvantages between the excluded and included groups.27 Simply stated, the
application of this contextual factor where the excluded group is disadvantaged in
the non-affirmative action context is likely to lead to discrimination, whereas in the
affirmative action context, it is not.
The fourth and final contextual feature discussed in Lovelace was the nature of
the interest affected. While it had been argued that the exclusion from the Casino
Rama project demonstrated a lack of recognition of these groups as self-governing
communities, the Court found such an assertion “remote.”28 This part of the
decision suggests that where money is the benefit provided by government, even
where it is a very large sum of money as was the case with the Casino Rama
project, the nature of the interests affected are not likely to suggest discrimination.
Simply stated, loss of pecuniary benefits are less likely to point to a section 15(1)
violation than the loss of fundamental privacy interest or an ability to participate in
democratic processes.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Lovelace decision has many positive aspects. It confirms the importance of
ameliorative, targeted programs in achieving substantive equality. It permits
_______________________________________________________________
26

Lovelace, supra, note 21, at 999, quoting Law, supra, note 13, at 518, quoting Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 174-75.
27
Lovelace, supra, note 21, at 1000.
28
Id., at 1002.
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disadvantaged groups and governments to work together to build programs to
overcome stereotyping of these groups. It acknowledges that it is not necessary to
target the most disadvantaged group when developing an ameliorative program. As
well, the fact that the Court decision was unanimous suggests that it is committed
to a single vision of equality. The Casino Rama project itself will provide the
bands and their members much needed economic support.
Nevertheless, the question which must now be asked is whether the Court’s
vision of equality provides sufficient guidance and clarity. How practical is the
Law test when trying to ascertain violations of section 15(1)? Has Lovelace
modified the Law approach to equality rights, at least in the affirmative action
context? What is the role of section 1 in light of the Law test? In this paper, it was
suggested that the contextual factors have changed to deal with unique features of
targeted ameliorative programs. The result is greater judicial deference toward
such programs and a concomitant diminution in the ability of any group, including
disadvantaged groups, to successfully challenge these programs.

